<Fair City Amsterdam> 'Cyberattacks' en false flag acties

[Natuurbescherming ZO]

https://www.kitklarenberg.com/p/cyberattacks-a-new-false-flag-frontier?r=9zg41&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web <https://www.kitklarenberg.com/p/cyberattacks-a-new-false-flag-frontier?r=9zg41&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web>

"At the start of June, Admiral Robert Bauer, head of NATO’s military committee, announced that the military alliance had finalised plans to recognise state-backed cyberattacks on its members as a dedicated pretext for activating Article 5. Reportedly “a joint decision of all allies,” from now on, foreign hacking blitzes can be countered with a collective NATO response, up to and including military measures. Bauer’s disclosure passed the media by entirely - but this is a seismic development, heralding a modern, digital form of ‘false flag’.

Article 5, which provides for collective defence in the event a NATO member is attacked, was a core component of the military alliance’s founding treaty. While it has been invoked just once - by the US, in the wake of 9/11, to invade Afghanistan - there have been efforts to spark it before and since. Most recently, in November 2022, the government of Ukraine falsely declared a missile fired by Kiev that struck Poland, killing two people, was Russian in origin.

The purpose of this deceit was undoubtedly to embroil NATO formally and directly in the proxy war. Wise to the ruse, US officials harshly rebuked President Volodmoyr Zelensky publicly for the World War-threatening fraud. Such incidents amply underline Article 5’s susceptibility to abuse. Yet apparently, military alliance chiefs - and the bloc’s members - are keen to ever-expand its terms, well-beyond its initial remit. Adding cyberattacks to the roster of grounds for collective response is a long-standing objective.

In August 2019, NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg authored a bombastic op-ed declaring the military alliance would “guard its cyber domain and invoke collective defence if required.” A “serious cyberattack” on one member state could be “treated as an attack against us all,” he wrote, triggering Article 5 in the process. Fast forward two years, and Keith Alexander, US National Security Agency director 2005 - 2014, called on the ‘Five Eyes’ global spying network to construct a global unified cyberattack “radar”: “Imagine if we built a radar picture for cyber that covered not only what impacts Australia, but what impacts other countries, and we could share, in real time, threats that are hitting our countries…What we can do is share information and work together…Cyber is going to be hugely important for our future. It’s the one area where adversaries can attack Australia and the US without trying to cross the oceans…We have this anomaly: how are you gonna defend that which you can’t see?”

Alexander, who lied brazenly to the public about his agency’s spying capabilities - including while while testifying under oath to Congress - during his time as NSA chief, suggested this worldwide dragnet would contribute significantly to collective defence, in the obvious spirit of NATO’s Article 5. Given “proposals” for Orwellian, futuristic resources from Western politicians and military and intelligence officials almost invariably presage their real-world rollout, we can only assume in light of Bauer’s announcement such a “radar” is incoming.

‘Security Failures’

This interpretation is reinforced by Bauer observing how invoking Article 5 could only happen once it was confirmed a cyberattack was carried out by a state actor, not a private person or structure. “In that case, it would not be clear who to go to war with,” he added. It’s certainly a source of some relief that NATO is committed to securing clarity on “who to go to war with”, before launching a military “response” to a cyberattack.

However, these comments illuminate a very obvious, grave problem with adding cyberattacks to Article 5’s ambit. Identifying who or what is responsible for them to an absolute certainty is extremely difficult. This task is further complicated by a frequent lack of certainty over whether hackers operating from a particular state are doing so at the behest of authorities. For example, much has been made in Britain recently of  Russian hacking group Qilin, which supposedly infiltrated NHS servers.

Further muddying the picture, it has been confirmed that Western intelligence services can falsely attribute cyberattacks, with devastating effect. In 2017, CIA files published by WikiLeaks revealed how the Agency masks its hacking exploits, to make it appear another state actor was responsible. Dubbed ‘Marble Framework’, among other things the resource inserts foreign-language text into malware source codes to misdirect security analysts. The Framework can obfuscate in this manner via Arabic, Chinese, English, Farsi, Korean, and Russian.”

Dat betekent dat de NAVO, of tenminste een aantal oorlogshaviken in deze organisatie, het recht menen te hebben om op basis van vermeende en dubieuze ‘cyberattacks’ andere landen aan te vallen, waarvan de bron helemaal niet te controleren is. Ga er dan maar van uit dat geheime diensten zelf cyberattacks kunnen simuleren op eigen instellingen en kunnen misbruiken als oncontroleerbare ‘aanvallen’ om oorlogen te beginnen.
Men zoekt dus naar nieuwe smoezen om een oorlog te kunnen rechtvaardigen.

Hetty


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